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Assumption of Risk in NFL Concussion Litigation:
The Offhand Empiricism of the Courtroom
Jeffrey Standen*
Liability for defective athletic equipment can be difficult to
1
prove. In the fast-paced environment of contact sports, establishing
the element of causation can be insuperable. For example, in Testerman v. Riddell, where a football player alleged that the manufacturer’s
representative fitted him with undersized shoulder pads and thus
caused him serious injury during a scrimmage, the appellate court upheld the trial court’s ruling that the plaintiff’s case failed for lack of
2
definitive proof of causation. The plaintiff’s expert failed to establish
whether or not the injury resulted from the opponent’s blow or contact with the ground, whether or not the injured area was covered by
the pad at the moment of impact, and whether or not larger pads
3
would have precluded the injury in the circumstances. Assuming causation can be established, sports equipment manufacturers may be
4
5
held liable for negligence, breach of warranties, and defective prod*
Van Winkle Melton Professor of Law, Willamette University. Andrew MacKendrick
provided
able research assistance.
1
Commonly available defenses include lack of privity and incurred risk. See generally DAN
DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 369-374 (2000); Moore v. Sitzmark Corp., 555 N.E.2d 1305, 1307
(Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (incurred risk).
2
Testerman v. Riddell, Inc., 161 F. App’x. 286, 288, 290 (4th Cir. 2006); see also Byrns v.
Riddell, Inc., 550 P.2d 1065, 1069 (Ariz. 1976) (football helmet design defective).
3
Testerman, 161 F. App’x. at 289; see also Fort Lauderdale Country Club, Inc. v. Winnemore, 189 So. 2d 222, 224 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1966) (holding golf club liable in golf cart
accident, even where the driver of cart was negligent, and finding the golf club negligent in failing to keep carts locked away, in that, negligence of an intervening actor should have been foreseen).
4
McCormick v. Lowe & Campbell Athletic Goods Co., 144 S.W.2d 866, 871–72 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1940) (finding a negligent failure to test pole used in pole vault); Dudley Sports Co. v.
Schmitt, 279 N.E.2d 266, 274 (Ind. Ct. App. 1972) (finding a negligent design and manufacture of
pitching machine); James v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 299 S.W.2d 92, 94 (Ky. 1957) (finding that
although shattered baseball bat was defective, defendant was not negligent because the risk of
bats breaking is common knowledge and therefore, not an unreasonable risk).
5
Hauter v. Zogarts, 534 P.2d 377, 387 (Cal. 1975) (finding misrepresentation that a golf
device was safe and a breach of implied warranty of merchantability); Bell Sports, Inc. v. Yarusso,
759 A.2d 582, 592–93 (Del. 2000) (holding that representations found in helmet’s manual created
express warranties that formed a basis for manufacturer’s liability for off-road motorcyclist’s
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6

ucts, much like any other manufacturer. Similarly, stadium owners can
7
be held liable for defective field conditions.
The defense of assumption of risk is disfavored as a general mat8
ter in modern tort law. The widespread adoption of comparative fault
schemes has rendered such absolute defenses to liability no longer as
9
relevant. Nevertheless, assumption of risk remains a viable doctrine
10
in tort cases arising out of sporting contests. However, assumption of
risk has provided a defense only in actions for negligence and not for
11
those in which intentional or reckless conduct is alleged. In addition,
neck injury that resulted in paraplegia); Seaside Resorts, Inc. v. Club Car, Inc., 416 S.E.2d 655, 662
(S.C. Ct. App. 1992) (finding breach of implied warranty of merchantability for golf cart battery
charger plugs, which caused fire damaging plaintiff’s club house).
6
Nissen Trampoline Co. v. Terre Haute First Nat’l Bank, 332 N.E.2d 820, 825–26 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1975) (finding liability for failure to warn about danger from trampoline springs); Brett v.
Hillerich & Bradsby Co., No. CIV–99–981–C, 2001 WL 36162669, at *1, 6 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 29,
2001) (discussing manufacturer’s liability where a pitcher was injured by a batted ball due to the
bat being defective in allowing batted balls to reach dangerous speeds); Everett v. Bucky Warren,
Inc., 380 N.E.2d 653, 658–59 (Mass. 1978) (finding defective design of hockey helmet).
7
Maddox v. City of New York, 487 N.Y.S.2d 354, 358–59 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (finding the
defendant was not liable for wet outfield); Heldman v. Uniroyal, Inc., 371 N.E.2d 557, 567 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1977) (discussing assumption of risk where player was injured while playing on a tennis
court with bubbles on the playing surface); Zachardy v. Geneva Coll., 733 A.2d 648, 651 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1999) (finding the defendant not liable for divot in baseball field).
8
Kenneth W. Simons, Reflections on Assumption of Risk, 50 UCLA L. REV. 481, 482
(2002) (“the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability, recently adopted by the
American Law Institute, explicitly repudiates the defense, rejecting the provisions of the Restatement (Second) of Torts that recognized it.”) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS §§ 2
cmt. i, 3 cmt. c (2000)) (noting that the modern view is that assumption of risk should be completely merged or assimilated within comparative fault and abolished as a distinct doctrine); see,
e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226, 1229 (Cal. 1975) (holding that “the doctrine of comparative negligence is preferable to the ‘all-or-nothing’ doctrine of contributory negligence from the
point of view of logic, practical experience, and fundamental justice.”).
9
Presently, only Alabama, Maryland, North Carolina and Virginia have retained contributory negligence. The other 46 states have rejected contributory negligence and adopted some
form of comparative negligence. See Kathleen M. O’Connor & Gregory P. Sreenan, Apportionment of Damages: Evolution of a Fault-Based System of Liability for Negligence, 61 J. AIR L. &
COM. 365, 369-70, nn.20-21 (1996); In the federal sphere, comparative negligence has been the
rule since 1908, in cases arising under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, see 45 U.S.C. § 53
(2006), and since 1920, in cases arising under the Jones Act, see 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2006), and the
Death on the High Seas Act, see 46 U.S.C. § 30304 (2006).
10 See generally Keya Denner, Taking One for the Team: The Role of Assumption of the
Risk in Sports Tort Cases, 14 SETON HALL. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 209 (2004); Timothy Davis, Avila
v. Citrus Community College District: Shaping the Contours of Immunity and Primary Assumption of the Risk, 17 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 259 (2006).
11 Ordway v. Superior Court, 243 Cal. Rptr. 536, 542 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); Turcotte v. Fell,
502 N.E.2d 964, 970 (N.Y. 1986) (finding failure to allege intentional misconduct rendered the
defense of assumption of risk available to preclude the claim); Tomjanovich v. California Sports,
Inc., No.H–78–243, 1979 WL 210977, at *1 (S.D. Tex.Oct. 10, 1979) (finding a defendant may
not prevail on an assumption of risk defense in a case involving a punch to the jaw of the plaintiff where the intent to injure and the force used is far greater than necessary to accomplish a
legitimate objective within the score of play); Kabella v. Bouschelle, 672 P.2d 290, 294 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1983) (holding that “a cause of action for personal injuries between participants incurred
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even if a participant has assumed the inherent risks of sport, that assumption does not necessarily include an assumption of the risk of
12
negligence. In products liability cases, assumption of risk typically
requires that the plaintiff be aware of the risk of defendant’s conduct
and that the plaintiff have subjectively agreed to accept the risk and to
13
encounter it. With this type of assumption of risk, the plaintiff must
subjectively understand the danger, and then voluntarily and not neg14
ligently decide to accept the risk. Moreover, some courts have determined that being compelled to take a risk by an employer obviates
15
the “voluntariness” requirement of the assumption of risk defense.
An employee who is aware of the risk but is required by his employer
16
to use the product has not voluntarily accepted the risk.
A. Courtroom Empiricism
In the Ordway litigation, veteran horse jockey Judy Casella was
thrown from her horse during a race and injured when her mount
17
rolled over her. Casella’s horse had stumbled after becoming entangled with another race-horse, whose jockey, it was later determined by
the California Horse Racing Board, violated a racing rule by “crossing
18
over without sufficient clearance, causing interference.” As a result
19
of his violation, the jockey was suspended from racing for five days.

during athletic competition must be predicated upon recklessness or intentional conduct, ‘not
mere negligence.’”); Ross v. Clouser, 637 S.W.2d 11, 13–14 (Mo. 1982) (holding that “a cause of
action for personal injuries incurred during athletic competition must be predicated on recklessness, not mere negligence.”).
12 Konesky v. Wood Cnty Agric. Soc’y, 844 N.E.2d 408, 412 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (finding
“the risk of being trampled by runaway horse was not an inherent risk of horse racing, and thus
doctrine of primary assumption of risk did not apply”); Ashcroft v. Calder Race Course, Inc., 492
So. 2d 1309, 1311 (Fla. 1986) (finding jockey did not assume risk of negligently located exit gap
on the racetrack).
13 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A cmt. c (1965).
14 Id.
15 E.g., Staub v. Toy Factory, Inc., 749 A.2d 522, 526 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) (finding ‘“a plaintiff will not be precluded from recovering except where it is beyond question that he voluntarily
and knowingly proceeded in the face of an obvious and dangerous condition and thereby must
be viewed as relieving the defendant of responsibility for his injuries.”’ (quoting Struble
v. Valley Forge Military Acad., 665 A.2d 4, 6 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995)).
16 Tew v. Sun Oil Co., 407 A.2d 240, 243–44 (Del. Super. Ct. 1979) (noting that an individual
who faces a known dangerous condition, rather than risk of losing his job, cannot be said to have
voluntarily assumed the risk of injury); Cremeans v. Willmar Henderson Mfg. Co., 566 N.E.2d
1203, 1207 (Ohio 1991) (abolishing assumption of risk in the employment setting in Ohio, and
holding that an employee does not voluntarily assume the risk of injury when that risk must be
encountered in the normal performance of required duties).
17 Ordway v. Superior Court, 243 Cal. Rptr. 536, 537 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
18 Id.
19 Id.
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Subsequently, Casella brought a negligence suit. The court dismissed
Casella’s complaint on the grounds that she had assumed the risk that
21
another contestant would violate a racing rule. “[B]y participating in
the horse race, she relieved others of any duty to conform their conduct to a standard that would exempt her from the risks inherent in a
sport, where large and swift animals bearing human cargo are locked
22
in close proximity, under great stress and excitement.” In sports, the
court added, “[i]f the defendant’s actions, even those which might
cause incidental physical damage in some sports, are within the ordinary expectations of the participants . . . no cause of action can suc23
ceed based on a resulting injury.” The scope of “ordinary expectations,” the court made clear, includes conduct that comprises “routine
rule violations” that are “common occurrences” and “within the pa24
rameters of the athletes’ expectations.” Less common misfeasances
are “jury material;” where a player’s misconduct was obviously outside of the normal expectations of participants in the sport, liability is
25
appropriate.
It is upon the distinction between expected and unexpected occurrences that most sports tort litigation turn. Here, the unimpressive
fact-finding methodology of the legal system is visible. An answer to
the question of the type of conduct athletes expect when playing a
game appears to demand an empirical inquiry that plumbs the subjective understanding of veteran players. How often, for instance, must
bean-balls occur for them to be deemed “reasonably expected” by the
20

Id.
Id. at 544. For a different understanding of the relationship between assumption of risk
and comparative fault, see Segoviano v. Hous. Auth., 191 Cal. Rptr. 578, 579–80, 583 (1983) (involving an injury in a touch football game, holding that comparative fault precludes application
of assumption of risk, unless such assumption were explicit).
22 Ordway, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 543; contra Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 705 (Cal. 1992) (en
banc) (stating that the assumption of risk analysis in Ordway was a misinterpretation of California law, and noting that “it is thoroughly unrealistic to suggest that, by engaging in a potentially
dangerous activity or sport, an individual consents to . . . a breach of duty by others that increases
the risks inevitably posed by the activity or sport itself, even where the participating individual is
aware of the possibility that such misconduct may occur.”).
23 Ordway, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 544.
24 Id. Contra Knight, 834 P.2d at 709 (noting that a proper application of the assumption of
risk doctrine in the sports context does not depend on the particular plaintiff’s subjective knowledge of potential risk, but rather the nature of the defendant’s duty).
25 Griggas v. Clauson, 128 N.E.2d 363, 366 (Ill. App. Ct. 1955) (finding a jury verdict in
favor of plaintiff proper where defendant hit plaintiff twice from behind during basketball
game); Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 601 F.2d 516, 520–21, 527 (10th Cir. 1979) (discussing
plaintiff’s rights where defendant struck plaintiff’s neck during professional football game);
Averill v. Luttrell, 311 S.W.2d 812, 814–15 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1957) (baseball club not liable for
catcher’s assault on batter); Overall v. Kadella, 361 N.W.2d 352, 356 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (holding a hockey player was permitted to recover when defendant player intentionally punched him
in the face at the conclusion of the game).
21
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baseball player? The answer to the aforementioned question should
also be provided by a jury, the finder of fact, in a tort suit. Instead, the
cases are replete with instances of judges resolving the assumption of
risk defense as a matter of law, deciding whether or not a particular
course of conduct lies within or without the normally expected con26
duct incidental to the sport. Because judges must often announce the
basis for their decisions, the grounds for the finding are amenable to
analysis. Typically, judges rely on the trial testimony of witnesses, plus
a recitation of similar cases, to resolve the issue of whether or not certain conduct falls within the normally expected occurrences in the
27
game. Thus, the opinions of a few witnesses, coupled with apparent
connections to similar cases, form the basis for findings of judicial fact
as to an empirical matter.
B.

Expectations Defined

What is problematic about this methodology, apart from the fact
that it may well produce incorrect answers, is that the judicial finding,
28
once announced, sets the standard for future cases. Once a court
determines, on the basis of testimony and similar cases, that a baseball
batter “expects” to be subject to an intentional bean-ball from the
pitcher, for example, then a batter in a subsequent game, who is sub29
ject to an identical harm, may not claim he did not expect it. The
30
judge’s determination of expectations defines the sport itself.
For example, in Bourque v. Duplechin, during a softball game, the
defendant, running from first to second base, veered a few feet out of
the base path in an effort to prevent the second baseman, the plaintiff,
31
from completing a double play. The court held that the plaintiff as-

26 Knight, 834 P.2d at 706 (holding that “the question of the existence and scope of a defendant’s duty of care is a legal question which depends on the nature of the sport or activity in
question and on the parties’ general relationship to the activity, and is an issue to be decided by
the court, rather than the jury.”); Shin v. Ahn, 165 P.3d 581, 584 (2007) (stating that “‘a court need
not ask what risks a particular plaintiff subjectively knew of and chose to encounter, but instead
must evaluate the fundamental nature of the sport and the defendant’s role in or relationship to
that sport in order to determine whether the defendant owes a duty to protect a plaintiff from
the particular risk of harm.’” (quoting Avila v. Citrus Cmty. Coll. Dist., P.3d 383, 392 (Cal. 2006)).
27 See, e.g., Knight, 834 P.2d at 708-12.
28 See Avila v. Citrus Cmty. Coll. Dist., 131 P.3d 383, 393, 395 (Cal. 2006).
29 See id. at 393 (finding, as a matter of law, being intentionally hit by a bean-ball is an
inherent risk of baseball.).
30 See id. at 395 (noting that “the boxer who steps into the ring consents to his opponent's
jabs; the football player who steps onto the gridiron consents to his opponent's hard tackle; the
hockey goalie who takes the ice consents to face his opponent's slapshots; and, here, the baseball
player who steps to the plate consents to the possibility the opposing pitcher may throw near or
at him.”).
31 Bourque v. Duplechin, 331 So. 2d 40, 41 (La. Ct. App. 1976).
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sumed the risks from a batted ball, or from a runner, both “common
32
occurrences,” if the plaintiff had remained on the base path. The
plaintiff did not, however, “assume the risk of [the defendant] going
out of his way to run into him at full speed when [the plaintiff] was
33
five feet away from the base.” This conduct, the court held, was “un34
expected and unsportsmanlike.”
Decisions on these grounds are intensely factual and thus incapa35
ble of easy generalization. It is speculative to assess which fact of the
defendant’s conduct comprised the unexpected, and thus unconsented-to aspect, that gave rise to the defendant’s liability: the fact
that the collision came at full speed, or was outside the baseline, or
was five feet outside that line and not four or three feet outside the
line. Yet the court in Bourque ruled as a legal matter that the plaintiff
did not assume the risk of defendant’s conduct, thus precluding the
36
defendant’s main defense. Despite the elusiveness of capturing the
scope of plaintiff’s consent as to base runners, the decision is illustrative of the unmistakable import from this and other decisions: through
tort decisions, the courts have come to define the expectations of par37
ticipants in sporting contests.
One notable case stemmed from a collegiate baseball game in
which a pitcher for a California junior-college team hit an opposing
38
batter on the head, splitting his helmet and causing injury. Because
the pitcher's teammate had been hit the previous inning, the purpose
39
of the pitch was seemingly retaliatory. One defense offered by the
District, which operated the college and hosted the game, was that the
batter, by choosing to play in a baseball game, "assumed the risk" of
being thrown at by an opposing pitcher, even if the pitch was inten40
tionally aimed at his head in anger.

32 Id. at 42. Bourque held the defendant liable based on proof of negligence. One key
aspect of the decision, however, was the court’s determination that the defendant’s unexpected
conduct resulted from a reckless lack of concern for other participants. Thus, Bourque may fairly
be understood as partaking of the more general modern trend to require recklessness for tort
liability arising from a sports contest.
33 Id. at 43.
34 Id.
35 See Picou v. Hartford Ins. Co., 558 So. 2d 787-788, 790 (La. Ct. App. 1990) (finding in
women’s softball game, risk of collision at second base inheres in game; standard of care is reasonably prudent base runner attempting to gain second base).
36 Bourque, 331 So. 2d at 43.
37 Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 706 (Cal. 1992).
38 Avila v. Citrus Cmty. Coll. Dist., 131 P.3d 383, 385-386 (Cal. 2006).
39 Id. at 385-386, 393-394. Curiously, the appellate decision does not mention whether or
not the pitcher, on cross-examination, admitted to throwing at the batter intentionally.
40 Id. at 391, 400 (arguing that the District owed Avila no duty of care).
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California divides the doctrine of assumption of risk into two
41
categories: primary and secondary. Under the latter, the pitcher in
this case would owe the batter a duty of care, a duty not to negligently
or intentionally injure the batter, and the question would be whether
the batter knowingly exposed himself to the risk of the pitcher's fail42
ure to meet that duty. However, under the former, "primary" assumption of risk doctrine, the pitcher owes the batter no duty of care
43
at all. Being thrown at is just part of the game, and no liability attaches regardless of the pitcher’s intent or the batter’s knowledge.
The California Supreme Court applied the doctrine of primary assumption of risk to hold that, as a matter of law, a pitcher intentionally
throwing at a batter is part of the game, and thus one of the risks the
44
batter assumes when he steps into the box.
The determination that batters reasonably expect bean-ball
pitches appears to be a factual, empirical question, yet the court's answer to this question was derived from anecdote: the court's opinion
recites various instances of bean-balls and statements concerning
bean-balls and concludes that they are within the common expecta45
tion of batters. This form of offhand empiricism is a poor substitute
for the real thing. Yet grand empirical pronouncements based on an46
ecdote, if based on anything at all, permeate legal decisions. With this
decision, whether true as a factual matter or not, as a matter of law in
California the intentional bean-ball is within the field of risks that bat47
ters assume.
Although the Avila court posed an empirical question, it may
have not been interested in a “correct” empirical answer. Instead, as is
repeatedly the case in the application of the assumption of risk defense, the more plausible observation is that the California court chose
to define the sport of "baseball" to include the bean-ball. This choice
41 See Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226, 1229, 1235 (Cal. 1975) (abrogating doctrine of
contributory negligence and adopting rule of comparative negligence); Knight, 834 P.2d at 703
(interpreting the Li decision and defining primary and secondary assumption of risk). See also
Cal. Civ. Code § 1714 (2012).
42 See Knight, 834 P.2d at 703, 704.
43 See id. at 704.
44 Avila, 131 P.3d at 394.
45 Id. at 393.
46 See, e.g., Shin v. Ahn, 42 Cal. 4th 482, 486, 585 (2007) (finding that being struck by a
carelessly hit ball is an inherent risk in golf, the court noted “[w]hile golf may not be as physically
demanding as . . . basketball or football, risk is nonetheless inherent in the sport. Hitting a golf
ball at a high rate of speed involves the very real possibility that the ball will take flight in an
unintended direction. If every ball behaved as the golfer wished, there would be little ‘sport’ in
the sport of golf. That shots go awry is a risk that all golfers, even the professionals, assume when
they play.”).
47 Avila, 131 P.3d at 394 (finding “[f]or better or worse, being intentionally thrown at is a
fundamental part and inherent risk of the sport of baseball.”).
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suggests a larger role for the assumption of risk defense, one that is
infused with policy considerations.
First, courts in tort suits arising from sports contests are clearly
concerned about the introduction or intrusion of tort liability into
48
sporting activities. Imposing tort liability for wrongful pitches would
require judges and juries to assess the unstated intentions of pitchers.
It would also require evaluating whether the club or the coach followed the proper standard of care in training the pitcher, and did not
negligently employ a pitcher without adequate control so as to avoid
wild pitches. As a result, the introduction of tort law would put a
premium on control pitchers over hard-throwing but comparatively
wild pitchers. This might introduce a measure of self-dealing into
game decisions, as coaches might put less effective but better-control
pitchers on the mound in order to avoid personal liability, even if the
team’s interests were otherwise.
Second, courts liberally applying the assumption-of-risk defense
might conclude that opposing teams can minimize the frequency and
danger of brush-back pitches better than judicial tribunals. By concluding that the batter "assumed the risk" as a matter of law, the California court was effectively deciding that the intentional harm done
49
by the pitcher would result in no legal remedy. Under these circumstances, the batter's remedy is retaliation: the pay-back pitch where his
teammate throws at an opposing batter. The denial of a legal remedy
makes sense if the teams can minimize the joint risks of batting by
working together, under the implicit threat of retaliation, to avoid unnecessarily throwing at opposing batters.
C.

Football Head Injuries

Oddly, the fact that so many former football players suffer from
injuries resulting from concussive and sub-concussive head traumas
militates in favor of the defense. The more common the event, the

48 Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 710 (Cal. 1992) (noting that, “even when a participant’s
conduct violates a rule of the game and may subject the violator to internal sanctions prescribed
by the sport itself, imposition of legal liability for such conduct might well fundamentally alter
the nature of the sport by deterring participants from vigorously engaging in activity that falls
close to, but on the permissible side of, a prescribed rule.”); Avila, 131 P.3d at 394 (noting that
“it is one thing for an umpire to punish a pitcher who hits a batter by ejecting him from the
game, or for a league to suspend the pitcher; it is quite another for tort law to chill any pitcher
from throwing inside.”).
49 Avila, 131 P.3d at 394 (finding “[i]t is not the function of tort law to police such conduct.”).
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50

more plausible is the claim of assumption of risk. In the offhand empiricism of the courtroom, anecdote is evidence, and the claim that an
omnipresent aspect of the game of professional football such as heads
colliding causes injury seems, by the very evidence the plaintiffs will
adduce, widespread and thus part of the game. In short, the game of
football, as the court will likely come to define it, inevitably includes
repeated blows to the head, thus precluding participants injured by
those blows to complain about their ineluctable consequences.
The fact that the employer-employee relationship in the NFL is
established through collective bargaining also militates in favor of the
defense. Players are aware of the risks of the game and bargain over
the terms and conditions of employment on a regular basis. Unlike
other instances of risks allegedly hidden by the defendant, such as the
allegations against tobacco company defendants in some of the ciga51
rette litigation, here the plaintiffs are not faceless consumers but instead are unionized employees with substantial input into all facets of
the game, including the rules of the game. The decision of the players,
acting collectively and through their bargaining unit, to voluntarily
accept the rules of the game also suggests they voluntarily accepted
the consequences of those rules. Those consequences include repeated blows to the head.
On average, it would appear that much football head trauma, although certainly not all of it, resulted from “legal” conduct, that is,
from conduct on the field that is explicitly or implicitly permitted by
the rules of the game. The two most common activities that cause hits
52
to the head are blocking and tackling, both permitted activities. Although “leading with the head” is counseled against, the head is attached to the shoulders, and it is going to be in harm’s way whenever
the upper body is used to block or tackle, which is to say on nearly
every play. If the damaging blows to the head came exclusively or
primarily from conduct not permitted by the rules of the game, such as
from spearing or head-butting, for example, then the plaintiffs’ claims
would be stronger. The players in that scenario could claim that the
scope of their consent was limited to conduct permitted by the game
rules, and excluded conduct expressly prohibited by the game rules.
50 See, Prosser & Keeton, TORTS § 18 (5th ed. 1984) (“One who enters into a sport, game
or contest may be taken to consent to physical contacts consistent with the understood rules of
the game.”).
51 See, e.g., Phillip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007) (“In this state negligence
and deceit lawsuit, a jury found that Jesse Williams' death was caused by smoking and that petitioner Philip Morris, which manufactured the cigarettes he favored, knowingly and falsely led
him to believe that smoking was safe.”).
52 Roger Goodell, OFFICIAL PLAYING RULES AND CASEBOOK OF THE NATIONAL
FOOTBALL LEAGUE § 3, 34, R. 3 (2012), available at http://www.nfl.com/rulebook.
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The players could then argue that the game’s owners or employers
should have taken stronger measures to protect players from extralegal conduct outside the assumed risks. But the facts are the opposite: the players appear to have been injured by legal conduct, unmistakably of the kind to which they expressly consented and anticipated
in playing the game. They had a choice. They could have walked off
53
the field.
Finally, the plaintiffs will attempt to avoid the assumption of risk
defense by claiming that the NFL had information about the longterm risks of playing the game and withheld that information from the
players. Unaware of the true risks involved in the sport, the plaintiffs
cannot be deemed to have assumed them. This contention will lie at
the heart of the trial advocacy concerning assumption of risk. Undoubtedly some “smoking gun” memorandum or email will be discovered wherein some NFL consultant fretted out loud about the risks of
head injuries, only to be told to proceed cautiously or gather more
evidence by league superiors. This sort of evidence can have great
appeal to a jury. It may not move a judge, however, who will assess
the empirical claim about expectations and known risks as a matter of
law. A substantial body of literature about football injuries and their
effect on long-term health has appeared for many years in the popular
54
press. As a matter of law, the players have as much access to that
literature as does the NFL. It will be difficult for the players to claim
that they played the game unaware of the risks inherent in the sport.

53 Maddox v. City of New York, 487 N.Y.S.2d 354, 358-359 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (finding
player could have refused to play on slippery outfield, thus assumption of risk negates claim
against facility and employer for unsafe work condition); Zachardy v. Geneva Coll., 733 A.2d 648
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1999) (holding assumption of risk barred baseball player from recovery from
injury sustained on baseball field with ruts and depression because he voluntarily continued to
play); Avila v. Citrus Cmty. Coll. Dist., 131 P.3d 383, 395 (Cal. 2006) (finding that because Avila
voluntarily participated in the baseball game his consent would bar any battery claim as a matter
of law).
54 Head Injuries in Football, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2012), http://topics.nytimes.com/
top/reference/timestopics/subjects/f/football/head_injuries/index.html (The New York Times has
published articles related to football head injuries dating from 1894 to the present).

